24 January 1961

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### CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

## BULLETIN



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#### TOP SECRET

25X6

24 January 1961

CONTENTS

4. Situation in Turkey unstable despite moves toward return of civil government. (No Backup)
5. West Germany continues efforts to improve relations with Poland. (Backup, Page 2)

7. Argentina to ask Soviet bloc nations to reduce their diplomatic representation in Buenos Aires. (No Backup)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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	*Argentina-USSR: Argentina intends to ask the USSR to reduce the size of its embassy in Buenos Aires from the pres-				25X1
ent total of 42 to 20 within the next three months. Notes will be sent later to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary,					
	and Bulgaria requ				
	one half of the present legation staffs. Argentina, concerned about Communist penetration in Latin America, appears determined to press its request. When a suggestion along these				
	lines was made to	the Soviet and Polish missioned as "inconvenient."	ns last Novem-	<b>a</b>	25X1
	ber, it was reject	ed as monyone			25X1
	24 Jan 61	DAILY BRIEF	iv		

### Bonn Seeks Improvement of Relations With Poland

Negotiations for improved West German relations with Poland seem to be under way. Berthold Beitz, general manager of the Krupp industrial enterprises, says he has been authorized by Chancellor Adenauer to negotiate the establishment of a West German trade mission in Warsaw-possibly one having consular functions. Beitz arrived in Warsaw on 22 January.

After a conversation with Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz during a visit to Warsaw last month, Beitz returned to Bonn convinced that the Poles are willing to establish diplomatic ties without insisting on immediate West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border. The boundary question and the so-called "Hallstein doctrine" by which Bonn refuses to have diplomatic relations with any country other than the USSR which recognizes East Germany have been the major stumbling blocks to an improvement of relations between Bonn and Warsaw.

A similar attempt to improve relations in 1958-59 failed because of Warsaw's insistence on immediate resumption of full diplomatic ties rather than following the step-by-step procedure desired by Adenauer. Although Beitz maintains that Premier Cyrankiewicz indicated a willingness to agree to exchange permanent trade missions as a first step, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki and other diplomatic officials have continued to insist on full diplomatic relations.

The undersecretary in the West German Foreign Ministry informed American officials in Bonn that Adenauer had not raised the question of a trade mission with the Foreign Ministry and that he believed the chancellor would move cautiously in an election year to avoid alienating the expellees and refugees who make up about one fifth of the population. Adenauer, however, may be willing to make at least a gesture in order to convince the German public, as well as his allies, that he can

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25X1 25X1	publicly taking a "positive attitude" toward attempts to improve relations with Poland in hopes of removing the impression that the refugees are "disturbers of the peace" in East-West relations. German businessmen have long sought to expand formerly lucrative Eastern markets. The Poles have expressed strong interest in West German industrial products and also wish to increase exports of raw material and agricultural products to West Germany. At present, trade with Poland amounts to less than one percent of all West German foreign trade.  Statements by Polish leaders	
	have been extremely cautious on the question of a rapprochement with Bonn, but there are indications that negotiations are	
	proceeding on the Foreign Trade Ministry level in the establishment of economic relations while playing down the political problems involved.	25X1

24 Jan 61

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